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This paper seeks to investigate the influence of political uncertainty, surrounding the Australian 
federal election cycle, on financial market uncertainty. Measures of political uncertainty are 
constructed and their relationship with market uncertainty, as measured by implied volatility, 
explored. Empirical evidence suggests that increasing (decreasing) levels of uncertainty around the 
election induce higher (lower) levels of market uncertainty.  An increasing likelihood of the 
incumbent party, whose economic policies are presumably well-known, winning the election, 
reduces market uncertainty.  This relationship is stronger when political uncertainty is highest, 
when the business cycle contracting, and when the level of economic risk is high. Higher levels of 
political uncertainty tend to be associated with declining levels of outstanding debt, and lower 
issuance of long-term Government debt, driven by falling demand and higher yields.  
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The extant literature suggests that political factors may influence the risk premia inherent 
in financial assets. Hibbs (1986) suggests that differences in the economic policy of political 
parties have the potential to move the economy along different paths and results in different 
levels of return to both stock- and bond-holders. Johnson et al. (1999) examine the returns to 
several different asset classes in the period surrounding U.S. Presidential elections and report that 
while there is no difference in returns to large-cap stocks, returns to small-cap stocks are 
substantially higher during Democratic administrations, while Republican administrations result 
in superior bond market performance. This paper seeks to examine such relationships within the 
context of an electoral system with the non-U.S. characteristics of variable election timing and 
compulsory voting. Electoral polling data is utilised to construct measures of political uncertainty 
and the influence of this ambiguity on levels of implied market volatility and outstanding debt are 
considered within both an unconditional and economic-state-dependent framework. 
Pastor and Veronesi (2012 and 2013) theorise a general equilibrium model which suggests 
that the risk-premium is affected by both economic shocks and non-economic shocks, such as 
political uncertainty. In their model there is an “old” policy with which investors become familiar 
with over time. Uncertainty is created since the government can endogenously choose a “new” 
policy from a range of options at any time. Once the new policy is chosen and announced, 
investors again learn about its impact. The model suggests that, independent of traditional risk 
factors, political uncertainty directly affects the risk premium. An important insight from Pastor 
and Veronesi (2013) is that the composition of the risk premium is state-dependent; in particular, 
political uncertainty constitutes a large fraction of the premium during economic contractions 
precisely because policy change is more likely during such times. Kelly, Pastor and Veronesi 
(2013) reinterpret this model in the context of an election; empirical evidence suggests that 
investors are willing to pay more for option protection in light of uncertainty around election 
results.  
Empirical work has produced substantial evidence as to the influence of political 
outcomes on the stock market with market uncertainty rising as the day of voting approaches and 
uncertainty about the result increases. Li and Born (2006) study the period 1964-2000 and find 
that whilst the mean daily stock return rises in the 3-month period prior to U.S. elections when 
the outcome is uncertain, it is indistinguishable from the non-election period when the 
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incumbent party is assured of re-election. Goodell and Vähämaa (2013) utilize data from the Iowa 
Electronic Market, a betting market for the U.S. Presidential election, and find support for the 
notion that information regarding the probability of a particular election winner reflects 
information about future macroeconomic policy. Julio and Yook (2012) provide evidence 
connecting political uncertainty to changes in fundamentals of the real economy as firms reduce 
expenditures during times of political uncertainty. 
Several studies have attempted to form an international perspective on the political 
uncertainty-market uncertainty relationship: Gemmill (1992) discovers a close relationship 
between U.K. polling and the FTSE Stock Index, Pantzalis et al. (2000) report that the connection 
between political uncertainty and the stock market differs in depending on the level of political, 
economic and press freedom, while Bialkowski et al. (2008) investigate a sample of 27 OECD 
countries and find that stock market return variance doubles during the week around the 
election. Importantly, the margin of victory and changes in political orientation of government 
are key factors in explaining the magnitude of the election surprise. 
There has also been some consideration as to how elections may impact the fiscal policy of 
Government. Drazen and Eslava (2010) examine investment spending by Government in the 
period around Colombian elections and show that investment spending tends to increase prior to 
the election, and has a positive impact on the incumbent’s re-election prospects. Veiga and Veiga 
(2007) demonstrate that similar behaviour exists in Portugal, and is more prevalent when the 
win-margin is small. Casette and Farvaque (2014) suggest that while the average level of debt has 
a negative impact on the probability of re-election, pre-election debt accumulation by incumbents 
increases their probability of re-election. Gao and Qi (2013) investigate the influence of political 
uncertainty around U.S. gubernatorial elections on the borrowing costs of public debt, measured 
by yields of municipal bonds, and report that yields increase sharply before elections and then 
reverse afterwards. 
In the sense that elections impact the macro-economy of a nation through the mechanism 
of fiscal and economic policy followed by the Government, this study is related to the broader 
field of research into the impact of news announcements on market uncertainty. The general 
result (Ederington and Lee, 1996; Nikkinen and Sahlström, 2004; Smales, 2013) being that an 
upcoming macroeconomic announcement creates uncertainty which quickly dissipates once the 
data is released. Of particular relevance, Nikkinen and Sahlström (2004), Vähämaa, Watzka and 
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Äijö (2005), Chen and Clements (2007) and Vähämaa and Äijö (2011) examine the behaviour of 
implied volatility around macroeconomic announcements and document that, having risen prior, 
implied volatility falls following the broadcast as uncertainty is resolved.  There has been little 
empirical work on implied volatility indices in the Australian context to-date. However, Frijns et 
al. (2010) construct an implied volatility index for the Australian equity market and observe a 
significant and asymmetric relationship between the volatility index and stock returns; echoing 
prior findings in U.S. markets. 
 Essentially, this paper asks a single key question: does political uncertainty impact 
financial market uncertainty? Relating this question to prior research, three hypotheses are 
formulated.  
H1: An increase (decrease) in political uncertainty will lead to an increase (decrease) in 
market uncertainty as measured by implied volatility – i.e. there is a positive relationship. 
H2: Familiarity with the economic policies of the incumbent party, will result in market 
uncertainty falling (rising) as the likelihood of the incumbent party winning the election 
increases (decreases) – i.e. there is a negative relationship. 
H3: Congruent to the theoretical model of Pastor and Veronesi (2013), political 
uncertainty will play a more important role in determining market uncertainty during 
periods when the economy is weaker; this is when policy change, and also change in 
government, is most likely. 
Whilst the empirical framework utilised in the first section of this paper is similar to that 
employed by Goodell and Vähämaa (2013) this paper still succeeds in making several 
contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, in contrast to Goodell and Vähämaa (2013) who 
assume the outcome of the election is known a priori, I use polling data to construct unique 
measures of ex-ante political uncertainty. Secondly, prior work has focused heavily on equity 
markets and largely ignored bond markets yet it is likely that a change in government would also 
have an impact on bond yields, particularly through fiscal policy, and therefore this study 
attempts to rectify that prior omission. Third, this paper provides empirical evidence as to the 
circumstances under which political uncertainty has a particularly important influence on 
financial market uncertainty. Fourth, this paper contributes to the extant literature by examining 
how political uncertainty affects the process of debt issuance. Finally, by extending the existing 
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work to an Australian dataset the results are placed in the context of an electoral system that has 
very different characteristics in so far as there exists variable timing1 of federal elections, a two-
party preferred voting system, and where voting is also compulsory. 
 The empirical findings establish a clear relationship between Australian financial market 
uncertainty, as measured by implied volatility, and political uncertainty around federal election 
polling. In particular, the implied volatility of both equity and bond options increases in line with 
election uncertainty around the outcome of the poll result. The likelihood of the incumbent 
remaining in power reduces market uncertainty; consistent with the market preferring 
incumbents where economic policy is known. The results are significant even after controlling for 
macroeconomic variables and the possibility that economic conditions may affect voting 
intentions. Further investigation reveals that market uncertainty appears to be most sensitive to 
political uncertainty when such uncertainty is highest (i.e. when polling results are closest), when 
the business cycle is in contraction, and when the level of economic risk is high. In addition, 
higher levels of political uncertainty tend to be associated with declining levels of outstanding 
debt, and lower issuance of long-term Government debt, driven by falling demand and higher 
yields.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The second section provides background 
information on the nature of Australian federal elections and also describes the election, financial 
and macroeconomic data used in the empirical analysis. The third section presents methodology 
and reports the empirical findings on the role of political uncertainty in the uncertainty of equity 
and bond markets. Finally, section four provides concluding remarks and suggestions for future 
research. 
2. Data 
2.1 Election Uncertainty in Australian Federal Polls 
Whilst the Australian Parliament has an upper house (the Senate) it is the election for the 
lower house (the House of Representatives) that is of most interest to this study as the outcome 
forms the basis for Government; a full-preference instant runoff voting system is used in which 
voters number the candidates on the ballot paper in the order of their preference2. House 
                                                            
1 The election can be held a maximum of 3-years after the Parliament sits following the prior election. 
2 See www.aec.gov.au for more detailed information. 
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elections take place at least every 3 years, with the 2010 election resulting in the first hung 
parliament since 1940. 
Whilst the Australian political system consists of many political parties, only two have a 
realistic chance of winning sufficient representation in the House to form a government. As such, 
there is a de facto two-party system with the Australian Labor Party (ALP) at the socialist (left) 
end of the political spectrum and the Liberal-National Party (L-NP) Coalition3 espousing more 
conservative (right) views. Traditionally, the ALP has had a predilection for fiscally expansionary 
policy that favours workers and unions, while the L-NP has in general favoured smaller 
government and policy that favours business. At the most basic level the differences between 
Australian political parties are analogous in many ways to that between the Democratic (Labour) 
Party and the Republican (Conservative) Party in the U.S. (U.K.). 
In the eight federal elections held in Australia since 1993, the stock market has risen by 
an average of 2.2% in the month prior to a L-NP election win, and fallen by 0.9% in the month 
prior to an ALP win. In the month subsequent to the election result, the stock market has rallied 
by 2.2% on average regardless of the winner. Once election uncertainty is resolved on polling 
day, volatility measures fall by 24.9% (13.7%) following L-NP (ALP) success. This suggests that 
the stock market rises (falls) in anticipation of business friendly (unfriendly) policies by the L-NP 
(ALP) and then continues to rise as uncertainty about the election and subsequent policies is 
resolved. The reaction to electoral results is somewhat different in the bond markets. Yields on 5-
year government bonds rise by 3.7% (9.3%) on average following L-NP (ALP) poll wins, and the 
change in yields in more pronounced when comparing to changes in U.S. yields over the same 
time period; Australian yields rise by 10% (1.2%) more than comparative U.S. yields in the month 
prior to an ALP (L-NP) win and while yields continue to rise relative to those in the U.S. in the 
aftermath of an ALP win, they actually fall (by 4.0% on a relative basis) following a L-NP win. 
Likely, this result owes much to the market reflecting differences in economic policy inherent 
within the two parties, and in particular the expansionary fiscal policy generally pursued by the 
ALP.  
 The two-party preferred vote (2PP) is the result of an election or opinion poll after 
preferences have been distributed to the two major parties. Owing to the nature of the Australian 
                                                            
3 Officially, the Coalition consists of the Liberal Party of Australia, the National Party of Australia, the Liberal National 
Party and the Country Liberal Party. 
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electoral system, the two-party preferred vote data collected by polling companies is of particular 
interest when seeking to determine the likely winner of forthcoming elections. This study utilizes 
federal voting intention data expressed as a two-party preferred vote provided by Roy Morgan 
Research; a leading independent polling company4. Figure 1 – Panel A depicts how the ALP and 
L-NP have performed in the opinion polls for the five Federal elections in the 2000 – 2013 time-
frame on the basis of 2PP polling. 
 In this study, the release of the poll is defined as the date on which it could begin to 
influence financial market returns. For example, if a poll is released on a Sunday then the next 
trading day is taken to be the poll date. For each election year, I examine polls for the calendar 
year prior to polling day; since polls are generally released on a fortnightly basis this will give a 
base sample of 26 fortnightly releases of polling data, to which is added additional weekly polls 
that take place in the period immediately prior to the election data5.  
Whilst Goodell and Vähämaa (2013) introduce two measures of political uncertainty 
based on the ex-post probability of the eventual winner succeeding, this paper focuses on ex-ante 
measures of the election uncertainty around the incumbent government; this seems to be a more 
realistic measure of election uncertainty, reflecting information that is available to option traders 
in the bond and equity markets at the time polling data is actually released. IUn,t, a measure of 
Australian federal election uncertainty is constructed, where n refers to the election year and t 
refers to the time until the election date. The 2PP opinion poll result for the party out of power, 
On,t, is subtracted from the 2PP result for the party of the incumbent Prime Minister, In,t. The 
difference is then divided by the poll’s sampling error6 (σn,t): 
𝐼𝐼𝑛,𝑡 = �𝐼𝑛,𝑡 − 𝑂𝑛,𝑡� 𝜎𝑛,𝑡�                (1) 
                                                            
4 Roy Morgan Research was founded in 1941 and as well as being the longest established public opinion 
polling company in Australia, is independent from ownership by any media companies, and it’s opinion 
polls were most accurate in forecasting the outcome of the Australian federal elections during the time-
frame considered in this study. 
5 To ensure consistency of the polling data I exclude telephone-based polls from the sample owing to their 
well-documented selection bias. 
6 Sampling error information is based on the number of people taking part in the sample and is provided by 
the polling company at the same time the poll results are released; this “margin of error” is normally within 
the range of 2-4% 
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 EUn,t is introduced as a second measure of election uncertainty. EUn,t captures the 
difference between the probability of re-election of the incumbent party, and the probability of 
the other party winning the election. EUn,t is defined: 
𝐸𝐼𝑛,𝑡 = 1 − �𝑃𝐼𝑛,𝑡 − �1 − 𝑃𝐼𝑛,𝑡��                 (2) 
Where PIn,t denotes the probability of success of the incumbent party. When both parties 
have an equal probability to become elected (i.e. PIn,t = 0.5) then EUn,t equals one. When either of 
the parties is certain to win the election (i.e. PIn,t = 0 or 1) then EUn,t equals zero. The test 
variables utilised within the empirical analysis are %∆IUn,t and %∆EUn,t – the percentage change 
in the respective measures of electoral uncertainty. 
2.2 Financial Instruments and Macroeconomic Data 
 The financial instruments utilized within the empirical analysis are exchange-traded 
futures and options contracts based on the S&P/ASX 200 (the leading benchmark for Australia’s 
equity markets) and the 3-year Treasury Bond (the most actively traded Australian bond futures 
contract). Daily closing data is collected from Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH), provided 
by SIRCA7, and the Australian Securities Exchange8. To ensure that the study concentrates on the 
most liquid contracts only the nearest futures contracts are considered. In-line with market 
convention, the contract under consideration is rolled on the last day of the month preceding the 
delivery month.  
A measure of implied volatility is constructed using the daily closing levels of ATM call 
and put options; the closing implied volatility level of the two nearest to expiry option contracts 
are interpolated in order to ensure a constant option maturity of 30 days. This produces a 
measure, 𝜎𝑛,𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆, that represents the expected volatility of the S&P/ASX 200 (SPX) over the next 
30-days, and is similar in fashion to the widely used CBOE VIX index. Similarly, 𝜎𝑛,𝑡3𝑌𝑌 represents 
the expected volatility of 3-yr Treasury bond futures over the same period. Figure 1 – Panel B9 
depicts how each measure moves over time in the period around the four elections considered in 
this article. Note the spike in equity market volatility around the events of September 2001, and 
the apparent positive relationship between volatility and the 2PP for the ALP. 
                                                            
7 Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific 
8 www.asx.com.au 
9 Note that since the implied volatility measure is general much lower for bonds than for equity markets, 
the measures are re-scaled in order to provide clarity of the evolution of each measure over time. 
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<Insert Figure 1> 
Since option implied volatility incorporates all available information that is relevant for 
forming expectations about future volatility, implied volatility is widely considered as the best 
estimate of market uncertainty.  In this study, the variables of interest are %∆𝜎𝑛,𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆 and %∆𝜎𝑛,𝑡3𝑌𝑌, 
the percentage change in the implied volatility level of the S&P/ASX 200 Index options and 3-
year Treasury Bond options respectively.  
 Changes in economic optimism and changes in expectations regarding macroeconomic 
risk will likely impact voting preferences, financial asset prices and market sentiment; therefore, a 
number of macroeconomic variables are included as control variables. %∆INFL is the percentage 
change in inflation as reported by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). Periods of increasing 
inflation are typically associated with increases in economic activity and more restrictive changes 
in monetary policy. %∆UNEMP is the monthly percentage change in unemployment reported by 
the ABS. %∆ASX is the percentage change in the S&P/ASX200 Index. %∆CONSCONF is the 
monthly percentage change in consumer confidence as reported by Westpac / Melbourne 
Institute, and it would be expected that rising consumer confidence would follow from rising 
stock markets and falling unemployment. %∆RBACR is the percentage change in the official cash 
target rate of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA); this measure is included since it is the main 
instrument of monetary policy and influences many facets of economic activity. %∆AUDTWI is 
the percentage change in the trade-weighted-index of the Australian dollar. The change in slope 
of the yield curve10, ∆3s10s, is included since this provides information on market expectations of 
future economic activity and future changes in interest rates. Finally, an economic risk rating 
(ERR) index is introduced as an alternative means of controlling for economic influences. The 
ERR index11 assigns risk points to a pre-set group of factors, termed economic risk components, 
that includes GDP, annual inflation, the budget balance and current account balance. A lower 
(higher) risk point total indicates a higher (lower) level of economic risk within the country. 
<Insert Table I> 
                                                            
10 Yield curve slope is measured as the difference between the yields on 3- and 10-yr Treasury Bonds.  
11 Obtained from the PRS group (https://www.prsgroup.com/). This index is only available on a monthly 
basis so a log change in the monthly ERR is calculated and then allocated to each day in the particular 
month to which it relates. This provides a series of daily log changes in ERR for each period in the sample. 
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Table I provides summary statistics for all of the variables used within the empirical 
analysis. The table shows that the mean and standard deviation for both implied volatility 
measures was highest in the period prior to the 2007 federal election; notably this was the 
incumbent L-NP lost at the polls. The mean values of the measures of political uncertainty are 
relatively minor but exhibit a relatively large standard deviation; %∆IUn,t was highest prior to the 
2004 election and %∆EUn,t highest prior to the 2010 election. Clearly, %∆INFL has been the most 
volatile macroeconomic variable over the period considered, although it is interesting to note that 
this measure was generally declining whilst L-NP was the incumbent party and was increasing 
prior to the 2010 election when the ALP was incumbent. 
Table II provides the Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables used in the 
regression analysis of this paper. Note the negative correlation between %∆IUn,t and implied 
volatility measures, and the positive correlation between %∆EUn,t and implied volatility measures; 
implied volatility declines as the incumbent becomes more likely to win since market participants 
have a greater understanding of the economic policies of the incumbent, while implied volatility 
increases as election uncertainty increases. Unsurprisingly, there is a positive relationship 
between the implied volatility measures for equity and bond markets. In-line with the findings of 
Whaley (2009) there is a significantly negative relationship between %∆ASX and implied 
volatility, that is implied volatility rises as the stock market declines and vice-versa. The 
correlation between the macroeconomic variables makes intuitive sense as rising (falling) interest 
rates (RBACR) would likely be commensurate with rising (falling) inflation, falling (rising) 
unemployment, rising (falling) consumer confidence, and a rising (falling) Australian Dollar. 
<Insert Table II> 
3.  Empirical Results 
3.1   Implied Volatility and Political Uncertainty 
The first stage in the empirical analysis of the role that political uncertainty plays in 
influencing implied volatility, and hence market uncertainty, is to perform a regression of the 
form: 
%∆𝜎𝑛,𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1%∆𝐼𝐼𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽2%∆𝐸𝐼𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽3%∆𝜎𝑛,𝑡−1𝑖 + ∑ 𝜆𝑛election fe𝑛,𝑡𝑘−1𝑛=1 + 𝜀𝑛,𝑡                 (3) 
 Where %∆𝜎𝑛,𝑡𝑖  is the percentage change in implied volatility of instrument i (that is 
S&P/ASX 200 or the 3-yr government bond), %∆𝐼𝐼𝑛,𝑡 is the percentage change in the likelihood 
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of the incumbent party winning the election, %∆𝐸𝐼𝑛,𝑡 is the percentage change in election 
uncertainty, election fe𝑛,𝑡 are control variables for election fixed effects, and 𝜀𝑛,𝑡 is the error term. 
A one-period lagged percentage change in implied volatility is included since the volatility of the 
financial instruments considered is mean-reverting.  
<Insert Table III> 
Table III reports the results for the regression presented in Eq. (3), a disaggregation of the 
model into each of the election periods considered is also presented in order to allow for analysis 
of how the relationship has evolved over time. In consideration of the aggregate panel models, for 
the fixed effect specification makes it clear that the level of implied volatility decreases as the 
probability of the incumbent winning increases although this is only significant for equity 
options, providing evidence that uncertainty is lower when the prospective economic policy of 
election winners is known to the market; if the likelihood of the incumbent winning increases by 
1% then implied volatility decreases by approximately 0.5%. Election uncertainty has a significant 
positive effect on the implied volatility of both equity and bond option markets although the 
magnitude of the effect is greatest for SPX options; a 1% increase in election uncertainty results in 
a 0.8% increase in SPX implied volatility and a 0.16% increase in 3-yr bond option implied 
volatility. Upon consideration of the disaggregated model, the influence of election uncertainty 
on implied volatility is apparently declining over time for both equity and bond options. 
Given the historical performance of Australian financial markets in the proximity of 
federal elections conditional on different parties winning, it is possible that changes in implied 
volatility may differ dependent on the polling performance of a preferred party. A second 
equation is introduced: 




+ 𝜀𝑛,𝑡          (4) 
Where %∆𝐼𝐼 ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑛,𝑡 is an interaction term between percentage changes in the level of 
incumbent uncertainty and a dummy variable indicating that the L-NP is the incumbent party; 
effectively controlling for uncertainty when L-NP is incumbent. The other variables are defined 
as for Eq. (3). The results for Eq. (4) are presented in Table IV. Election uncertainty has a 
significant positive impact on both measures of implied volatility; that is implied volatility 
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increases when election uncertainty rises. Additionally, the lagged implied volatility term is 
significantly negative in a confirmation of mean reversion. Interestingly, %∆IU is no longer 
significant, or negative, as before however the interaction term with change in L-NP incumbency 
is both significant and negative. This result suggests that market uncertainty is actually 
responding to changes in the possibility that the L-NP Coalition will be re-elected, and effectively 
implied volatility measures fall if the likelihood of the L-NP remaining in power increases.  
<Insert Table IV> 
In order to gain an understanding as to the circumstances under which election 
uncertainty is most important, Eq. (4) is augmented by a series of dummy state-variables that 
indicate whether the electoral polling is close12 (i.e. there is most uncertainty about the election 
outcome), whether economic conditions indicate high levels of economic risk13, and whether the 
business cycle is in contraction14. Results are reported in the last 6 columns of Table IV. 
Considering the results for close polling results first, it is apparent that changes in political 
uncertainty that occur when polling is particularly close are most important; significance for the 
non-interaction variables wanes, while %∆EU is highly significant when polling is close. 
Introducing the interaction term for high levels of economic risk (Low_ERR) demonstrates that 
political uncertainty is also important in this scenario, that is when economic risk is high then 
changes in political uncertainty (both %∆IU and %∆EU) have a positive and significant 
relationship with changes in market uncertainty. Perhaps the most interesting result is found 
when considering contractions in the business cycle. Consistent with the theoretical model of 
Pastor and Veronesi (2013), the stage of the business cycle is shown to have a substantial 
influence on the reported relationship with %∆EU having a highly significant impact on market 
uncertainty during contractions over and above that found in non-contractionary periods. The 
                                                            
12 The dummy variable is set to 1 if the 2PP poll result lies in the narrowest quintile of polling margins, and 
0 otherwise. 
13 High levels of economic risk are defined as the lowest quintile of ERR; if the observation lies within this 
quintile the dummy variable is set to 1 and is 0 otherwise. Note that all observations in the lowest quintile 
of ERR occur during ALP government incumbency and therefore interaction with the L-NP incumbency 
dummy variable is excluded as this is a linear combination and produces a near singular matrix. 
14 During the sample period the Australian economy did not suffer a recession in the traditional sense. 
Therefore, contraction is indicated using the growth cycle peak to trough as defined by the Melbourne 





positive and significant coefficient for %∆IU∙LNP∙Contraction could be explained as the market 
becoming more concerned (i.e. market uncertainty increasing) if the L-NP incumbent party 
responsible for the economic policies that have placed the business cycle in contraction has a 
higher likelihood of re-election.  
3.2  The influence of macroeconomic factors 
It is possible that macroeconomic factors also have a significant influence on market 
uncertainty and the implied volatility of exchange traded options. Macroeconomic variables are 
introduced into the model specification in order to examine whether the impact of political 
uncertainty remains when controlling for economic conditions. A model is specified as follows: 
%∆𝜎𝑛,𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1%∆𝐼𝐼𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽2%∆𝐸𝐼𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽3%∆𝐼𝐼 ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽4%∆𝐼𝐿𝐼𝐿𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽5%∆𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑛,𝑡
+ 𝛽6%∆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽7%∆𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐴𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽8%∆𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽9%∆𝐴𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝑛,𝑡
+ 𝛽10∆3𝑠10𝑠𝑛,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑛,𝑡                                                                                                          (5) 
The regression results for Eq. (5) are reported in Table V, Column (1) and (6). Election 
uncertainty appears to have a positive and significant relationship with market uncertainty, even 
after controlling for economic variables, although this relationship is much stronger for equity 
options. A 1% increase in election uncertainty induces a 0.58% increase in SPX option volatility, 
and only a 0.4% increase in bond option volatility. %∆IU does not have a significant relationship, 
but the interaction term with L-NP incumbent is negative and well-defined for SPX options; that 
is, an increase in the possibility of a L-NP incumbent been re-elected decreases stock market 
uncertainty. 
<Insert Table V> 
Note the substantial increase in explanatory power, R2, as a consequence of including the 
macroeconomic variables. In particular, stock market returns appear to have a large impact on 
implied volatility. The percentage change in implied volatility of both instruments has a highly 
significant and negative relationship with changes in the S&P/ASX 200 Index, i.e. implied 
volatility falls as the stock market rises; a 1% rise in the stock market results in a 4.07% fall in the 
implied volatility of SPX options and a 0.59% fall in the implied volatility of 3-yr bond options. 
Changes in inflation are also found to have a negative relationship with implied volatility and two 
related explanations exist for this: Firstly, falling inflation will decrease the probability of rate 
increases by the RBA and hence be positive for asset prices. Secondly, subdued inflation may 
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evidence sound economic management by the incumbent government which will increase the 
possibility of re-election and hence reduce political and economic uncertainty. Given the close 
relationship between inflation and interest rate movements it is perhaps surprising that the 
coefficients for the implied volatility of bond options are not well defined. The lagged implied 
volatility variable remains significant and negative. Columns (2) and (7) act as a form of 
robustness check for the results such that a composite economic risk rating replaces the 
macroeconomic variables in the specification of Eq. (5). As ERR decreases (economic risk 
increases) market uncertainty increase; specifically if ERR increases by 1% then implied option 
volatility for SPX options will fall by 0.166%, and YTT options by 0.086%. Using this alternate 
specification changes the magnitude but not the direction, or significance, of the election 
uncertainty variables that are of interest. 
Again, to understand the conditions under which election uncertainty is most important, 
and address hypothesis H3, it is necessary to introduce state-variable dummies and interaction 
terms with the election uncertainty variables. For both equity and bond markets it is apparent 
that election uncertainty variables have a significant relationship with implied volatility only 
when the margin within the opinion polls are close; when this is the case %∆EU has a positive 
and significant relationship with markets, while %∆IU has a significant (negative) relationship 
with only the equity option market. Incorporating dummy variables for low ERR (i.e. high 
economic risk) the results, in Columns (4) and (9), suggests that election uncertainty has 
particular importance in periods of high economic risk; indeed, changes in %∆IU only have 
significance for the bond market in such periods. Similar results are found when consider periods 
of business cycle contraction noting that financial market uncertainty increases if the L-NP 
incumbent party responsible for economic policies during a contraction has a greater chance of 
re-election (increasing %∆IU∙LNP). 
As discussed earlier, it is likely that economic conditions will exert an influence on voting 
behaviour and so, following Goodell and Vähämaa (2013), an orthogonalization procedure is 
utilized to mitigate concerns related to jointly determined independent variables. Changes in 
election uncertainty, %∆EU, are regressed on lagged control variables that measure changes in 
macroeconomic factors: 
%∆𝐸𝐼𝑛,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1%∆𝐼𝐿𝐼𝐿𝑛,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2%∆𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑛,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3%∆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑛,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4%∆𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐴𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑛,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5%∆𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑛,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6%∆𝐴𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝑛,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7∆3𝑠10𝑠𝑛,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑛,𝑡                      (6) 
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The residual term, 𝜀𝑛,𝑡 of Eq. (6) measures the component of %∆UE that is uncorrelated 
with the macroeconomic variables. The residuals are employed to isolate the effects of federal 
elections, from changes in economic conditions, on implied market volatility. %∆EURESID is 
defined as the residual of Eq. (6) and is utilized in a regression specification where percentage 
changes in implied volatility are regressed on macroeconomic variables: 
%∆𝜎𝑛,𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1%∆𝐸𝐼𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐼𝐴𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽2%∆𝐼𝐿𝐼𝐿𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽3%∆𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑈𝑃𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽4%∆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑛,𝑡
+ 𝛽5%∆𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐴𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽6%∆𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽7%∆𝐴𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽8∆3𝑠10𝑠𝑛,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑛,𝑡                                                                                                                                 (7) 
Table VI reports the estimates of the regression specified in Eq. (7). In both cases the 
coefficient estimates for %∆EURESID are positive and statistically significant. These estimates 
demonstrate that implied volatility increases as election uncertainty increases, and also indicate 
that the positive association between market uncertainty and political uncertainty cannot be 
attributed to changes in macroeconomic conditions prompting a reaction in both election polling 
and implied volatility. The highly significant and negative relationship between stock market 
returns and implied volatility remains, as does the negative relationship between inflation and 
implied volatility. Finally, the mean reversion of volatility is again evident in the lagged implied 
volatility variable. 
<Insert Table VI> 
In summary, consistent with Li and Born (2006) and Bialkowski et al. (2008), the 
empirical analysis provides strong evidence that election uncertainty has a significant impact on 
market uncertainty. In addition, the results are analogous to the more general finding of prior 
work such that important scheduled news events create market uncertainty which is only 
resolved when the outcome is known. Consistent with hypothesis H1, the election uncertainty 
measure defined here exhibits a significant and positive relationship with implied volatility. The 
likelihood of the incumbent remaining in power reduces implied volatility, although this is 
primarily driven by the interaction with the L-NP Coalition being incumbent. This is consistent 
with Hypothesis H2 such that the market prefers incumbents where economic policy is known, 
and a particular preference for the L-NP which is often viewed as more sympathetic towards 
business.  
The introduction of macroeconomic control variables greatly increases the explanatory 
power of the expression, and in particular there is evidence of a significant negative relationship 
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between stock market returns and implied volatility. However, even after controlling for 
macroeconomic variables and the possibility that economic conditions effect voting intentions, 
election uncertainty remains a significant factor in determining market uncertainty in both equity 
and bond markets. Introducing dummy variables for the closeness of opinion polling and the state 
of the economy reveals additional information as to the circumstances in which election 
uncertainty is most important in influencing financial market uncertainty. Consistent with 
Hypothesis H3, market uncertainty appears to be most sensitive to election uncertainty when 
election uncertainty is highest (when polling is closest), when the business cycle is in contraction, 
and when the level of economic risk is high. Such results are also supported by Kelly, Pastor and 
Veronesi (2013) who note that option protection against political risk is more valuable when the 
economy is weaker. 
3.3 Political Uncertainty and Debt Issuance 
 A further consideration in the context of the impact of political uncertainty on Australian 
financial markets is the understanding of potential effects on changes in the levels of outstanding 
debt, and related issuance, by both Government and non-Government entities. A regression 
specification of the following form is used to gain an insight into this relationship:   
%∆𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑛,𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1%∆𝐼𝐼𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽2%∆𝐸𝐼𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛽3%∆𝐼𝐼 ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑛,𝑡  + 𝛽4%∆𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑛,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑛,𝑡        (8) 
Where %Δ𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑛,𝑡𝑖  is the percentage change in the outstanding amount of debt15 of type i 
(Short-Term or Long-Term, Government and Non-Government) and %Δ𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑛,𝑡 is the percentage 
change in the economic risk factor during period t, in election n. Percentage changes in Election 
Uncertainty (EU), Incumbent Uncertainty (IU), and the interaction term with the dummy for L-
NP incumbency (LNP) are specified earlier. Results are reported in Table VII. 
<Insert Table VII> 
The first result to note is that the constant term is positive and significant, implying that 
the level of outstanding debt of all types increases over the sample period. The second point is 
that changes in ERR have a highly significant relationship with changes in the level of 
outstanding debt. Recalling that lower ERR implies a higher level of economic risk, the level of 
outstanding Government debt increases as economic risk increases, while the level of ST debt of 
                                                            
15 Data provided from the Reserve Bank of Australia (www.rba.gov.au ) 
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Non-Government entities declines. Presumably this is a result of debt becoming prohibitively 
expensive for Non-Government entities at times of high economic risk, and Governments 
increasing borrowing to fund larger budget deficits. This is also consistent with corporations 
reducing expenditure during times of economic turmoil. 
%∆EU has a negative relationship with outstanding debt levels in all cases; however this is 
only significant for LT Government debt, where a 1% increase in election uncertainty is related to 
a 0.20% decrease in LT Government debt. The %∆IU∙L-NP incumbency interaction term has a 
dichotomous relationship with Government and Non-Government debt, with LT Government 
debt increasing as IU increases when L-NP holds power (indicative of L-NP issuing more long-
term debt if they appear more likely to remain in power), yet ST Non-Government debt does the 
opposite.  
Upon considering the effect of close polling periods it is apparent at a close polling 
margin, which is indicative of the highest levels of political uncertainty, result in higher levels of 
debt for both classes of borrower – perhaps this is a result of alternative types of finance (e.g. 
equity) becoming more expensive when political uncertainty is highest. The %∆IU∙LNP 
incumbency term is negative for LT Government debt when polling is close; it is possible to offer 
one explanation for this with the observation at incumbent L-NP Governments during the past 
decade or so have fought electoral campaigns on the basis of claims that they are more prudent 
economic managers and able to reduce Government debt levels16. Low levels of ERR (i.e. periods 
of high economic risk) are indicative of statistically significant increases in both ST and LT 
Government debt, while increases in Election Uncertainty (EU) have a negative relationship with 
LT Government debt during such periods. Periods of business cycle contraction do not result in 
any significant relationship being identified. 
Having identified that political uncertainty has a significant relationship with changes in 
the levels of outstanding debt, particular on those of LT Government debt, it is of particular 
interest to investigate whether political uncertainty impacts the characteristics of LT Government 
debt issuance. Data on bond issuance, particularly the dollar amount of bonds allotted, coverage 
ratio for the issue (defined as dollar amount of bids received divided by the dollar amount of 
bonds allotted), the average maturity of bonds issued, and the average yield of bonds issued is 
                                                            
16 For example The Federal Coalition Election Policy Commitments suggest that the L-NP will form a 
“government with less debt and an improved budget bottom line”. 
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obtained from the Australian Office of Financial Management (AOFM). The results for a 
regression specification similar to that in Eq. (8) with the characteristic of interest replacing 
outstanding debt levels as the dependent variables are reported in Table VIII. 
<Insert Table VIII> 
The results may be summarized as follows. First, an increase in election uncertainty 
(%∆EU) results in a decline in the size of bond issues, a decrease in the demand for the bonds 
issued (illustrated by the coverage ratio), and an increase in yields; suggesting that political 
uncertainty plays an important role in the issuance of Long-Term Government bonds. The 
relationship between %∆EU and the average maturity of bonds issued is driven by the periods of 
extremely close polling results. Second, increases in the Economic Risk Rating (i.e. reductions in 
levels of economic risk) result in a significant decrease in the size of bond issues, and an increase 
in the coverage ratio. Third, the size of bond issues tends to increase as %∆IU∙LNP increases, 
although this relationship is reversed on the occasions when polling is close. Lastly, the size of 
bond issues declines when polling is close. 
4.  Conclusion 
This study examines the effects of political uncertainty on the Australian debt and equity 
markets. Empirical measures of political uncertainty are constructed, using opinion polling data, 
for five Australian election cycles between 2001 and 2013 in order to investigate three 
hypotheses, and also to conduct an initial investigation as to the relationship between political 
uncertainty and debt issuance. 
The empirical results indicate that Australian federal election uncertainty has a significant 
impact on market uncertainty. In particular, the implied volatility of both equity and bond 
options increases in line with election uncertainty around the outcome of the poll result. Market 
uncertainty falls as the likelihood of the incumbent winning rises, this is especially so if the L-NP 
is incumbent. The results are robust to the inclusion of macroeconomic control variables, and are 
consistent with the notion that the Australian federal election process may result in fluctuating 
levels of uncertainty among market participants as they revise their expectations regarding the 
future direction of economic policy. Such results are consistent with the work on the U.S. 
Presidential election stated by Goodell and Vähämaa (2013) and suggest that election uncertainty 
has an influence on financial markets regardless of the electoral system in place. The theoretical 
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model of Pastor and Veronesi (2013) proposes that political uncertainty is state-dependent and 
most important during economic contractions. In light of this model, the introduction of dummy 
variables to control for the economic cycle, and the closeness of opinion polling, reveal that 
Australian financial markets appear to be most sensitive to political uncertainty when election 
uncertainty is highest (polling is close), when the business cycle is contracting and the level of 
economic risk is high. 
With polling regularity and political scrutiny increasing during the period surrounding 
elections, the results presented in this article provide strong evidence that market participants are 
likely to be effected by the level of political uncertainty. One policy implication that arises from 
the results in this paper would be that political parties may reduce uncertainty in financial 
markets by flagging their economic policies well in advance; of course, this would not make a 
difference if market participants did not believe such polices would actually be implemented or 
sustained in the event of an election win. 
Whilst this paper has contributed to the evidence of the ways in which political 
uncertainty influences financial market uncertainty, and made an effort to investigate how this 
feeds through to the level, and issuance, of debt there are several areas of further research that 
would appear worth of consideration. Firstly, gaining a greater understanding of the mechanism 
by which Government debt issues are affected would be of interest to both Governments and 
potential bidders at debt auctions. Second, greater focus could be given to the issues that 
corporations face when attempting to raise funds (whether through debt or equity) in times of 
political uncertainty. For instance, what are the effects of political uncertainty on access to 
markets, and the relative cost of issuing debt and equity? Perhaps some industries would be more 
susceptible to political uncertainty in terms of both capital raising, and implied volatility 
measures, that others? Finally, it may be possible to utilise information from betting markets, such 
as betmetrix17 in order to understand the dynamics of election and market uncertainty at a higher 
frequency.  
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Panel A: Polling results - 2 party preferred polling for Australian federal election
































































Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
%∆σSPX 0.10 22.97 -0.44 11.43 2.13 12.67 -0.30 12.11 -2.06 16.10 -0.16 13.23
%∆σ3YB 1.07 4.14 -0.59 8.97 1.37 9.41 -0.97 5.20 0.22 8.00 0.10 7.56
%∆IU 0.21 7.90 0.28 3.85 0.02 7.25 -0.17 4.87 0.32 8.79 0.08 6.06
%∆EU 0.41 5.84 -0.03 3.34 0.02 7.25 0.44 6.50 -0.22 4.10 0.21 5.84
%∆INFL 0.27 1.53 -0.07 0.38 -0.44 0.26 0.16 0.75 0.14 0.38 -0.02 0.73
%∆UNEMP 0.36 2.12 -0.69 2.69 -0.78 2.22 -0.98 1.92 0.55 2.43 -0.52 2.24
%∆ASX 0.18 2.81 0.43 1.36 0.60 2.20 0.28 3.20 0.58 2.23 0.37 2.39
%∆CONSCONF -0.75 6.08 0.14 2.63 -0.38 5.37 1.32 5.60 -0.19 4.43 0.08 4.92
%∆RBACR -1.27 2.37 0.32 1.40 0.40 1.19 1.31 3.32 -1.01 2.26 0.19 2.07
%∆AUDTWI 0.18 2.19 0.22 1.63 0.24 1.87 0.22 1.92 -0.33 1.58 0.22 1.90
∆3s10s 0.04 0.19 -0.17 0.12 -0.03 0.16 -0.07 0.19 0.06 0.20 -0.06 0.16
%∆ERR -0.04 1.23 0.04 0.22 -0.08 0.43 0.09 0.49 0.33 1.65 0.07 0.80
Number of obs.
2001 Election 2004 Election 2007 Election 2010 Election Overall2013 Election
TABLE	I
Summary Statistics for implied volatility, political and macroeconomic variables
29 32 31 32 15632
Note:  This table presents summary statistics for the data used in the empirical analysis of this paper. Variables include the percentage change of implied 
volatility of SPX equity options and 3-yr government bond options. In addition, the percentage change in measures of political uncertainty (IU and EU ) and a 
range of macroeconomic control variables including inflation, unemployment, consumer confidence, the RBA cash rate, the AUD trade-weighted index, and 
the Economic Risk Rating (ERR) index are included. 
%∆σSPX %∆σ3YB %∆IU %∆EU %∆INFL %∆UNEMP %∆ASX %∆RBACR %∆CONSCONF %∆AUDTWI
%∆σ3YB 0.273
%∆IU -0.134 -0.073
%∆EU 0.240 0.030 0.207
%∆INFL -0.091 -0.101 0.081 0.028
%∆UNEMP 0.034 -0.122 -0.067 -0.001 -0.136
%∆ASX -0.779 -0.222 0.145 -0.252 -0.045 -0.027
%∆RBACR 0.123 -0.028 -0.079 -0.020 0.376 -0.103 -0.129
%∆CONSCONF 0.077 -0.011 0.083 0.083 0.160 -0.165 0.129 0.146
%∆AUDTWI 0.168 0.024 0.008 0.082 0.145 -0.042 -0.114 0.022 0.302
∆3s10s 0.320 0.033 -0.202 0.207 -0.093 -0.007 -0.291 0.092 -0.150 -0.042
TABLE	II
Correlations for implied volatility, political and macroeconomic variables
Note:  This table reports the cross-correlations for the variables included within the empirical anaysis of this paper. Variables include the 
percentage change of implied volatility of SPX equity options and 3-yr government bond options. In addition, the percentage change in 
measures of political uncertainty (IU and EU) and a range of macroeconomic control variables including inflation, unemployment, consumer 
confidence, the RBA cash rate, and the AUD trade-weighted index are included.
Variable 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 Model 1 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 Model 1
Constant 0.127 -1.140 1.737 -0.575 -2.091 0.246 0.389 -0.568 1.387 -0.948 0.347 0.054
(3.722) (1.487) (2.142) (2.321) (2.749) (1.336) (0.486) (1.301) (1.507) (0.979) (1.383) (0.611)
%∆IU -1.220** -1.808* -0.248 -0.047 -0.041 -0.528** -0.045 -0.003 -0.010 -0.319 -0.312 -0.131
(0.586) (1.032) (0.332) (1.731) (0.544) (0.241) (0.074) (0.847) (0.257) (0.750) (0.268) (0.130)
%∆EU 2.122** 1.102** 0.252* 0.602** 1.533** 0.832*** 0.715*** 0.445** 0.322** 0.186* 0.564* 0.158**
(0.830) (0.502) (0.148) (0.242) (0.709) (0.255) (0.140) (0.197) (0.156) (0.106) (0.308) (0.074)
AR(1) -0.200* -0.299* -0.096* -0.084 -0.188 -0.045*** -0.592** -0.229* -0.182* 0.004 0.002 -0.227**
(0.108) (0.173) (0.049) (0.199) (0.181) (0.010) (0.265) (0.127) (0.106) (0.179) (0.175) (0.098)
Fixed or random - - - - - Fixed - - - - - Fixed
adj. R2 0.293 0.214 0.209 0.115 0.138 0.186 0.740 0.212 0.132 0.019 0.082 0.082
F-Stat 2.904 2.393 1.902 1.218 2.603 2.547 10.433 1.178 0.452 0.087 1.483 1.483
No. Obs 29 32 31 32 32 156 26 32 31 32 32 153
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
TABLE	III
Base regression: Influence of political uncertainty on market uncertainty
%∆σ SPX %∆σ 3YB
Note: This table presents results from the base regression set out in Eq. (3) whereby the percentage change in implied volatility of SPX equity options, 
and 3-yr bond options, are regressed on the percentage change in the two identified political uncertainty variables (Incumbent Uncertainty, IU, and 
Election Uncertainty, EU) as well as one-lagged term of the dependent variable. A simple linear OLS is used to disaggregate into individual election 
cycles, while a panel based model (with fixed time effects) is utilized to analyze the overall effect. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
Variable %∆σ SPX %∆σ 3YB %∆σ SPX %∆σ SPX %∆σ SPX %∆σ 3YB %∆σ 3YB %∆σ 3YB
Constant 0.301 0.059 0.634 0.004 0.126 0.066 0.276 0.279
(1.248) (0.613) (1.288) (1.146) (1.134) (0.846) (0.718) (0.727)
%∆IU 1.158 0.043 0.256 0.972 1.278 0.137 0.173 0.109
(0.756) (0.392) (0.385) (0.546) (1.075) (0.243) (0.331) (0.669)
%∆EU 1.496*** 0.173** 0.194 1.407 1.585*** 0.113 0.125 0.191**
(0.377) (0.087) (0.285) (0.332) (0.349) (0.183) (0.197) (0.072)
%∆IU ·LNP -2.216** -0.226 -0.394 -0.044 -2.464** -0.256 -0.317 -0.289**
(0.944) (0.480) (0.461) (0.546) (1.204) (0.292) (0.337) (0.107)
AR(1) -0.197** -0.227** -0.063* -0.086* -0.079* -0.143* -0.144* -0.140*
(0.098) (0.099) (0.036) (0.045) (0.046) (0.079) (0.079) (0.071)
Close_Poll 2.677 1.232
(3.388) (2.092)
%∆IU ∙Close_Poll -0.069 -0.113
(0.752) (0.290)
%∆EU ∙Close_Poll 2.069*** 0.147***
(0.653) (0.041)




%∆IU ∙Low_ERR 1.901** 0.180**
(0.959) (0.078)




%∆IU ∙Contraction -1.480 -0.001
(1.141) (0.712)
%∆EU ∙Contraction 1.382*** 0.064**
(0.516) (0.316)
%∆IU ·LNP ∙Contraction 3.389** 0.076**
(1.518) (0.031)
Fixed or random Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
adj. R2 0.250 0.085 0.215 0.140 0.166 0.052 0.049 0.059
F-Stat 2.727 1.923 3.051 2.205 2.442 2.629 2.721 2.582
DW 2.084 2.135 2.095 2.083 2.113 2.126 2.132 2.131
No. Obs 156 153 156 156 156 153 153 153
Un-Conditioned Conditioned on dummy state-variables
Regression: Influence of political party of incumbent Prime Minister
TABLE	IV
Note: This table presents results from the regression set out in Eq. (4) whereby the percentage change in implied volatility of 
SPX equity options, and 3-yr bond options, are regressed on the percentage change in the three identified political uncertainty 
variables (Incumbent Uncertainty, IU, and Election Uncertainty, EU, and an interaction term between Incumbent 
Uncertainty and the incumbent Prime Minisiter been a member of the LNP Coalition) as well as one-lagged term of the 
dependent variable. Indicators for close polling results (the narrowest quintile of poll results), high economic risk factors 
(defined as low ERR), and business cycle contraction are also included. A fixed time effects panel specification is used. 
Standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Constant 1.182 0.078 1.335 0.457 0.484 0.157 0.271 0.452 0.390 0.397
(0.802) (1.148) (1.213) (1.220) (1.219) (0.726) (0.718) (0.812) (0.784) (0.789)
%∆IU 0.863* 0.111 0.418 0.766 1.854* -0.049 0.088 0.183 0.202 0.381
(0.487) (0.372) (0.387) (0.559) (1.119) (0.412) (0.225) (0.246) (0.346) (0.694)
%∆EU 0.575** 0.925*** 0.251 1.299*** 1.413*** 0.036** 0.116** 0.148 0.170** 0.178**
(0.252) (0.246) (0.295) (0.345) (0.361) (0.018) (0.051) (0.119) (0.067) (0.082)
%∆IU·LNP -1.160** -0.646** -0.435* -0.102** -2.871** -0.031 -0.247 -0.328 -0.365 -0.564
(0.518) (0.279) (0.247) (0.045) (1.242) (0.522) (0.291) (0.297) (0.344) (0.771)
%∆INFL -0.067** -0.015** -0.040** -0.030** -0.020* -0.016* -0.018* -0.015*
(0.031) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
%∆UNEMP 0.096 0.005 -0.031 -0.038 -0.110 -0.224 -0.220 -0.229
(0.161) (0.207) (0.214) (0.214) (0.138) (0.137) (0.138) (0.139)
%∆ASX -4.066*** -4.121*** -4.080*** -4.048*** -0.590** -0.598** -0.595** -0.521*
(0.336) (0.439) (0.451) (0.454) (0.294) (0.285) (0.284) (0.289)
%∆RBACR 0.111 0.259 0.336 0.262 0.014 0.380 0.390 0.383
(0.320) (0.383) (0.400) (0.393) (0.285) (0.254) (0.257) (0.256)
%∆CONSCONF 0.040 0.037 0.153 0.174 -0.003 0.168 0.162 0.176
(0.177) (0.255) (0.266) (0.263) (0.151) (0.171) (0.172) (0.172)
%∆AUDTWI 0.317 0.446 0.302 0.261 -0.039 0.140 0.124 0.152
(0.318) (0.537) (0.561) (0.555) (0.273) (0.363) (0.367) (0.368)
∆3s10s 11.953 14.540 16.386 17.319 -2.721 -4.813 -4.495 -5.806
(11.305) (14.890) (15.496) (15.863) (9.646) (9.680) (9.770) 10.11
%∆ERR -0.166*** -0.086**
(0.055) (0.034)
AR(1) -0.158* -0.158* -0.115* -0.125* -0.115* -0.122* -0.143* -0.123* -0.126* -0.126*
(0.092) (0.080) (0.059) (0.073) (0.062) (0.065) (0.078) (0.071) (0.071) (0.073)
Close_Poll 3.032 1.807
(3.438) (2.168)
%∆IU ∙Close_Poll -1.125** -0.037
(0.469) (0.301)
%∆EU ∙Close_Poll 1.655*** 0.071**
(0.562) (0.034)




%∆IU ∙Low_ERR 1.909** 0.299**
(0.908) (0.137)




%∆IU ∙Contraction -1.962* -0.240*
(1.176) (0.137)
%∆EU ∙Contraction 1.111** 0.019**
(0.532) (0.009)
%∆IU ·LNP ∙Contraction 3.763** 0.433**
(1.574) (0.203)
Fixed/Random Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
adj. R2 0.684 0.615 0.749 0.699 0.718 0.138 0.115 0.150 0.143 0.143
F-Stat 5.601 4.978 2.520 3.890 2.982 3.041 2.724 2.919 2.800 2.759
DW 2.078 2.100 2.097 2.121 2.129 2.069 2.129 2.214 2.221 2.226
No. Obs 148 148 148 148 148 138 138 138 138 138
%∆σ SPX %∆σ 3YB
Regression: The influence of macroeconomic variables and political uncertainty on implied volatility
TABLE	V
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Note:  This table presents results from the regression set out in Eq. (5) whereby the percentage change in implied volatility of SPX equity options, and 3-yr bond options, are 
regressed on the percentage change in the three identified political uncertainty variables (Incumbent Uncertainty, IU, and Election Uncertainty, EU, and an interaction term 
between Incumbent Uncertainty and the incumbent Prime Minister been a member of the LNP Coalition), one-lagged term of the dependent variable, and on a number of control 
variables for macroeconomic variables. Economic variables are the percentage change in inflation (INFL ), unemployment (UNEMP ), the stock market (ASX ), the RBA cash rate 
(RBACR ), consumer confidence (CONSCONF), and A$ trade weighted index (AUDTWI ). The change in the level of the yield curve slope measure by the difference between 10-
yr and 3-yr government bond yields is also included (3s10s ). Indicators for close polling results (the narrowest quintile of poll results), high economic risk factors (defined as low 
ERR), and business cycle contraction are also included. A fixed time effects panel specification is used. Standard errors in parentheses.






















adj. R2 0.669 0.139
F-Stat 17.358 2.246
No. Obs 148 138
Regression: Robustness check when controlling for 
orthogonalized changes in election uncertainty
TABLE	VI
Note:  This table presents results from the regression set 
out in Eq. (7). %∆EURESID  represents the residual values 
obtained from regressing the election uncertainty variable, 
%∆EU , on macroeconomic variables. Standard errors are 
in parentheses.
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 1.917* 1.926* 1.927* 1.969* 2.099*** 1.975*** 2.096*** 2.104*** 0.708*** 0.659** 0.706*** 0.714*** 2.493*** 2.365*** 2.491*** 2.498***
(1.125) (1.119) (1.129) (1.342) (0.479) (0.499) (0.481) (0.482) (0.249) (0.258) (0.251) (0.252) (0.590) (0.625) (0.593) (0.599)
%∆IU 0.089 0.135 -0.267 0.117 -0.096 -0.284 -0.029 -0.496 0.083 0.159 0.186 -0.006 0.126 -0.00398 0.020 -0.074
(0.380) (0.446) (0.654) (1.087) (0.162) (0.186) (0.278) (0.462) (0.084) (0.096) (0.145) (0.241) (0.200) (0.233) (0.343) (0.574)
%∆EU -0.344 -0.257 -0.280 -0.062 -0.200** -0.327** -0.181* -0.170** -0.039 -0.082 -0.014 -0.024 -0.055 -0.066 -0.034 -0.336
(0.236) (0.301) (0.342) (0.350) (0.090) (0.125) (0.092) (0.074) (0.053) (0.065) (0.075) (0.078) (0.124) (0.157) (0.179) (0.185)
%∆IU·LNP 0.182 -0.015 0.503 0.052 0.286** 0.634** 0.207** 0.694** -0.145** -0.315** -0.217** -0.018* 0.026 0.002 0.006 0.109
(0.483) (0.598) (0.633) (1.217) (0.105) (0.250) (0.096) (0.318) (0.067) (0.129) (0.094) (0.010) (0.253) (0.312) (0.330) (0.643)
%∆ERR -3.449*** -3.423*** -3.517*** -3.414*** -2.296*** -2.335*** -2.258*** -2.295*** 0.837*** 0.892*** 0.864*** 0.861*** -0.019 -0.016 0.001 -0.017
(0.485) (0.491) (0.494) (0.488) (0.206) (0.206) (0.211) (0.208) (0.107) (0.106) (0.110) (0.108) (0.254) (0.257) (0.260) (0.258)
Close_Poll 3.796* 0.522* 1.234** 4.013**
(2.159) (0.276) (0.550) (1.817)
%∆IU ·Close_Poll -0.114 0.706* -0.260 0.102
(0.922) (0.385) (0.199) (0.482)
%∆EU ·Close_Poll -0.108 0.306 0.000 0.164
(0.599) (0.250) (0.130) (0.313)
%∆IU ·LNP ·Close_Poll 0.555 -1.084** 0.567** 0.105
(1.119) (0.468) (0.242) (0.586)
Low_ERR 3.191** 12.440*** 0.127 2.766
(1.317) (3.110) (1.712) (4.051)
%∆IU ∙Low_ERR 1.172 -0.451 -0.086 -0.188
(1.115) (0.475) (0.247) (0.586)
%∆EU ∙Low_ERR 0.505 -0.325** 0.107 -0.174
(0.785) (0.158) (0.174) (0.413)
Contraction 4.595 -0.016 -0.083 -1.062
(3.255) (1.395) (0.729) (1.730)
%∆IU ∙Contraction 0.030 0.475 0.090 0.106
(1.154) (0.492) (0.257) (0.612)
%∆EU ∙Contraction -0.637 -0.141 0.133 -0.064
(0.504) (0.214) (0.112) (0.266)
%∆IU ·LNP ∙Contraction -0.292 -0.664 -0.205 -0.167
(1.529) (0.651) (0.340) (0.807)
Fixed/Random Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
adj. R2 0.341 0.343 0.346 0.352 0.539 0.558 0.511 0.548 0.573 0.598 0.545 0.577 0.037 0.004 0.039 0.039
F-Stat 9.117 6.565 7.360 6.837 20.689 15.870 16.586 15.250 23.690 18.486 18.908 17.170 0.695 0.582 0.568 0.512
DW 1.830 1.856 1.830 1.861 2.067 2.095 2.098 2.084 1.928 1.982 1.938 1.912 2.048 2.104 2.051 2.044
No. Obs 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
Note: This table presents results from the regression set out in Eq. (8) whereby the percentage change in outstanding levels of Government and Non-Government debt (Source: RBA.gov.au) are regressed on the percentage change in the 
three identified political uncertainty variables (Incumbent Uncertainty, IU , and Election Uncertainty, EU , and an interaction term between Incumbent Uncertainty and the incumbent Prime Minister been a member of the LNP Coalition), 
and a control variable for the macroeconomic risk factors (ERR ). Indicators for close polling results (the narrowest quintile of poll results), high economic risk factors (defined as low ERR ), and business cycle contraction are also included. A 
fixed time effects panel specification is used. Standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
%∆ST Government Debt Outstanding %∆LT Government Debt Outstanding %∆ST Non-Government Debt Outstanding %∆LT Non-Government Debt Outstanding
Table	VII
Regression: The influence of political uncertainty on changes in levels of outstanding debt
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant 1.030* 0.351* 0.459* 0.900** 0.075 3.186 -0.690** -0.291**
(1.487) (1.152) (0.265) (0.482) (4.900) (5.165) (0.271) (0.136)
%∆IU -0.027 -0.887 1.052 0.966 1.459 2.331 0.202 0.439
(1.524) (1.909) (0.670) (0.832) (1.238) (1.511) (0.271) (0.336)
%∆EU -0.816** -0.618** -0.076** -0.030** -0.594** 1.695 0.565** 0.808***
(0.347) (0.275) (0.029) (0.012) (0.294) (1.246) (0.240) (0.277)
%∆IU·LNP 1.237** 0.275* -0.323 -0.659 -0.227 -1.794 -0.517 -1.012*
(0.564) (0.155) (1.171) (1.418) (2.163) (2.576) (0.474) (0.573)
%∆ERR -2.900** -3.030** 0.442* 0.395* -0.024 0.169 0.503 0.544
(1.155) (1.189) (0.247) (0.200) (1.750) (1.733) (0.386) (0.385)
Close_Poll -7.587** 3.235 -15.095 -0.206
(19.550) (8.517) (15.397) (3.288)
%∆IU ·Close_Poll 2.795 0.389 -2.923 -0.705
(3.352) (1.460) (2.653) (0.582)
%∆EU ·Close_Poll 1.079 0.922 -5.762** 1.047*
(3.553) (1.548) (2.812) (0.613)
%∆IU ·LNP ·Close_Poll -2.493** 1.867 3.897 1.433
(6.331) (2.758) (5.011) (1.104)
Fixed/Random Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
adj. R2 0.128 0.137 0.047 0.073 0.043 0.099 0.093 0.132
F-Stat 0.306 0.286 0.524 0.580 0.469 0.810 1.106 1.154
DW 3.580 3.603 2.365 2.341 3.159 2.967 2.517 2.381
No. Obs 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93
Note: This table presents results from the regression whereby the percentage change in factors of long-term Government debt issuance 
(Source: AOFM.gov.au), namely the $ amount issued , coverage ratio  of bonds issued, average maturity of bonds issued, and yield  of bonds 
issued, are regressed on the percentage change in the three identified political uncertainty variables (Incumbent Uncertainty, IU , and 
Election Uncertainty, EU , and an interaction term between Incumbent Uncertainty and the incumbent Prime Minister been a member of 
the LNP Coalition), and a control variable for the macroeconomic risk factors (ERR ). Indicators for close polling results (the narrowest 
quintile of poll results)are also included. A fixed time effects panel specification is used. Standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
%∆$Amount Issued %∆Coverage ratio of issue %∆Ave. maturity of bonds %∆Yield of bonds 
Table	VIII
Regression: Influence of political uncertainty on issuance of long-term Government bonds
